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Abstract
Factors facilitating collusion may not successfully predict cartel occurrence: when a
factor predicts that collusion (explicit and tacit) becomes easier, firms might be less
inclined to set up a cartel simply because tacit coordination already tends to go in hand
with supra-competitive profits. We illustrate this issue with laboratory data. We run
n-firm Cournot experiments with written cheap-talk communication between players
and we compare them to treatments without the possibility to talk. We conduct this
comparison for two, four and six firms. We find that two firms indeed find it easier
to collude tacitly but that the number of firms does not significantly affect outcomes
with communication. As a result, the payoff gain from communication increases with
the number of firms, at a decreasing rate.
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1 Introduction
Lists of factors facilitating collusion play a popular role in the industrial organization liter-
ature and in antitrust policy.1 Typical items on those lists include the fewness of firms (or
industry concentration),2 product homogeneity, firm symmetry or regular orders. For any
of these factors (and others), the notion is that, other things being equal, collusion is more
likely. The impact of such factors is very intuitive and can be rigorously derived with simple
repeated-game analysis.
Despite their popularity, the power of factors facilitating collusion in predicting cartel
occurrence is limited. Empirical research studying whether the factors correlate with the
frequency of detected cartels (Posner 1970, Hay and Kelly 1974, Grout and Sonderegger
2005, Levenstein and Suslow 2006) do not report clear-cut results. This is particularly the
case for the alleged correlation between cartel frequency and concentration or the number
of firms.3 It appears that facilitating factors are by no means reliable structural indicators
of cartel occurrence, although as Stigler (1970) suggests, it may be that samples of detected
cartels are biased in one way or another.
Why do facilitating factors not reliably predict cartel frequency? Any facilitating
factor may apply to both explicit (cartel-like) agreements and implicit (tacit) coordination.
The repeated-game incentive constraint—say, of a trigger strategy equilibrium—is a neces-
sary condition for cooperation to emerge as a subgame perfect equilibrium in both settings.
If, for example, collusion is easier with fewer firms, this will be true for legal tacit coordina-
tion and for illegal explicit cartels. But why should firms be more inclined to engage in illegal
price-fixing when they find it easier to cooperate tacitly? Instead, there may well be fewer
cartels in concentrated industries, not more; or this relationship may be non-monotonic.
Put differently, the reason why facilitating factors are not good predictors of cartel
activity is that the decision to set up a cartel should be driven by the additional profit the
cartel leads to, taking into account fines and the foregone profit when firms do not talk.
How big the additional profits from cartel-like communication are over and above the profit
1See, for example, Scherer (1980, ch. 7 and 8), Tirole (1989, ch. 6), Martin (2001, ch. 10), Motta (2004,
ch. 4.2) and Belleflamme and Peitz (2015, ch. 14). See also the treatment by Ivaldi et al. (2003).
2Concentration and number of firms will be correlated but they may not always be addressed by the
same facilitating factor: more concentrated industries may be less symmetric and therefore, all else equal,
less prone to collusion.
3To illustrate this puzzling finding, we quote here from various studies. Posner (1970) concludes that
“[a] large proportion [of the cartels were] in industries not normally regarded as highly concentrated”, Hay
and Kelly (1974) find that “in many cases larger groups conspire.” In a report for the British OFT, Grout
and Sonderegger (2005) state about several facilitating factors that “[i]ndeed, there is some element of
disconnection between the predictions and the variables that are relevant here.” And Levenstein and Suslow
(2006) find “no simple relationship between industry concentration and the likelihood of collusion.”
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obtained from tacit agreements is an entirely different question. Ex ante, it is not clear at
all that facilitating factors are a good predictor of this extra margin.
Figure 1 illustrates the issue. The literature gives the impression that, the fewer the
firms, the more explicit collusion is to be expected (downward sloping line). This conclusion
is consistent with the idea that fewer firms will find it easier to collude. However, it ignores
that explicitly colluding is costly. The costs of a cartel include the opportunity cost from
coordinating tacitly, organizational costs and cartel fines. We will argue that while more firms
may benefit more strongly from explicitly talking, the gain from talking might eventually
decline such that a medium number of firms benefits the most from colluding (concave curve).
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Figure 1: The number of firms and the likelihood of collusion.
In this paper, we demonstrate the force of this argument with data from laboratory
experiments. We study one facilitating factor, namely the number of firms, and we demon-
strate with these data that such facilitating factors are not suitable for cartel detection. We
run n-firm repeated Cournot oligopoly experiments with and without communication with
the goal of measuring the gain from communication as a function of n. Specifically, markets
with two, four, and six firms which either cannot communicate at all or communicate via a
messenger-type tool. A between-subjects comparison of the profits earned for each n then
quantifies the gain from communication.
Evidence for communication makes a fundamental difference in cartel cases, but eco-
nomic theory is currently not well equipped to justify this distinction or explain exactly how
communication facilitates cartel coordination. Regarding the notion that communication is
the defining element of a cartel, Whinston (2008) notes that “[i]t is in some sense paradoxical
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that the least contested area of antitrust is perhaps the one in which the basis of the policy
in economic theory is weakest. ... it would be good if we understood better the economics be-
hind this”. In our experiments we explore how and to what extent communication supports
collusion by quantifying of the gain from communication in Cournot oligopoly.
We believe that laboratory experiments are useful to examine “tacit vs. explicit col-
lusion.” In the lab we control the communication conditions rigorously. While we do not
consider lab experiments to be a substitute for field data cartel studies, it seems to us that
the polar cases of no communication and communication occur in the lab in an clean manner,
which is difficult to match with other types of data.
We find that duopolists indeed find it easier to collude without communicating than
subjects in markets with more firms. But since the number of firms does not significantly
affect outcomes with communication, the payoff gain from communication increases with
the number of firms at a decreasing rate. That is, markets with more firms gain less from
explicit communication.
2 Literature
The literature has firmly established that communication facilitates cooperation in social
dilemmas. Deutsch (1958) finds in a prisoner’s dilemma experiment that communication
before the start of the game leads to more cooperation. One of the earliest contributions
to experimental economics, Friedman (1967), reports on a number of Cournot duopoly ex-
periments where communication is allowed, and finds that subjects often coordinate on the
joint-profit maximum. Since then, many studies of this type have confirmed this result.
Examples include Isaac, Ramey and Williams (1984), Isaac and Walker (1988), Cason and
Davis (1995) and Davis and Holt (1998). Further research has established that the exact
form of communication is important (Brosig et al. 2003), but, overall, it has been established
that talking helps.4
Whereas there are several studies analyzing how the number of players affects the
degree of cooperation (Fouraker and Siegel 1963, Dolbear et al. 1968, Davis and Holt 1994,
Huck et al. 2004), little work with communication has been done in this area. Binger et al.
(1990) compare two and five firms in Cournot markets with and without communication.
Their results are difficult to compare to more recent studies because subjects communicated
face-to-face. Waichmann, Requate and Siang (2014) compare Cournot markets with two and
three firms using both students and managers as subjects. In addition to free communication,
4Landeo and Spier (2009) demonstrate anticompetitive effects of communication in the context of exclusive
dealing. See also Boone et al. (2014).
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they also investigate a more standardized form of chat (preformulated messages). They find
that students are affected by the type of communication whereas managers are not. Under
standardized communication, managers select lower outputs than students, but there are no
differences in subject pools under free communication. Finally, they observe more collusion in
the duopolies than in the triopolies. Harrington et al. (2016) study the effect of firm numbers
(mainly two vs. three) in markets with price-setting firms, with and without communication.
Following Holt and Davis (1990), they also study (non-binding) price announcements as
an intermediate form of communication. They find that explicit communication leads to
near-monopoly prices throughout. Announcements have only moderate effects, and only for
duopolies.
Balliet (2010) conducts an interesting fully-fledged meta study of the effects of com-
munication in dilemma games. The effect sizes he reports are the mean differences in coop-
eration between no communication and communication. Regarding our research question,
Balliet (2010) finds that the effect of communication is stronger in larger groups. We will
return to this result in our conclusion.5
The closest paper to our present study is Fonseca and Normann (2012), which ana-
lyzes the gain from communication for symmetric Bertrand oligopolies in lab experiments.
They conduct experiments with two, four, six, and eight firms and find an inversely u-shaped
relationship between the number of firms and the incentive to collude. Our study differs from
Fonseca and Normann (2012) in two aspects. First, we analyze strategic substitutes (homo-
geneous Cournot competition) whereas they analyze strategic complements (homogeneous
Bertrand). A recent study by Mermer, Müller and Suetens (2016) shows for two-player ex-
periments without communication that collusive outcomes differ significantly between the
two formats, which motivated us to study the environment with collusion. Second, we use
novel text-mining methods to perform an in-depth analysis of the communication between
players, thus making a contribution to the literature on pre-play communication in games.
3 Experimental design and hypotheses
We run Cournot oligopoly experiments with an inverse demand function of p = 100 − Q.
Firms have marginal costs of c = 1. We selected this set of parameters for two main reasons:
comparability to Huck et al. (2004), and the fact that they made the computation of payoffs
easy to subjects in the absence of a payoff table.6
5Balliet (2010, p. 52) concedes that his study had too few larger groups to provide a thorough test and
that future research would benefit from studying larger groups. This is what our experiment does.
6Designing an experiment with varying the number of players introduced tough methodological issues.
Varying the number of firms means that using a payoff table would have forced us to restrict the set of
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We run a 3×2 factorial design, summarized in Table 1. The first treatment variable is
the number of firms, n. We use oligopolies with n ∈ {2, 4, 6} firms.7 Our second treatment
variable is the opportunity to communicate. In the treatments without communication
(labeled No-Chat), subjects had to post quantities in each period without being able to
communicate with each other. In the communication treatments (labeled Chat), subjects
were allowed to communicate in each period via typed messages, using an instant-messenger
communication tool. Communication was unrestricted and subjects were allowed to exchange
as many messages as they liked. However, they were not allowed to identify themselves. The
time to communicate was limited to one minute in the first period and 30 seconds thereafter.
Communication
Number of firms no yes
n = 2
No-Chat-2 Chat-2
9 (18) 9 (18)
n = 4
No-Chat-4 Chat-4
9 (36) 9 (36)
n = 6
No-Chat-6 Chat-6
6 (36) 6 (36)
Table 1: 3×2 factorial treatment design, treatment labels, and number of markets (and
participants) for each treatment cell.
The experiments were implemented as a repeated game. There was a minimum num-
ber of 20 periods; after period 20, play continued for another period with a 5/6 probability.
The continuation procedure was implemented with a random computer draw. The actual
number of periods was determined ex ante and was the same in all sessions and treatments
(namely 24). Each subject participated in one repeated game only. Players were always
matched with the same partner (fixed matching).
Table 2 summarizes the numerical predictions. In the Appendix, we provide a more
general analysis; we also do a comparative-statics analysis of n. Our first benchmark are
the static Nash equilibrium predictions (first row). If firms successfully coordinate on the
symmetric joint-profit maximum, quantities in the second row will materialize. Rows three
and four contain the profits corresponding to the static Nash equilibrium and the symmetric
joint-profit maximum.
quantities to be small. For instance, giving firms only three output levels, would result in a overly large
payoff table as there are rather many potential quantities a firm’s five competitors may produce. Furthermore,
having different treatments with different payoff table sizes could have introduced a confound by making
some treatments cognitively harder.
7Our hypotheses suggest that these are indeed the relevant treatments. Moreover, in treatments with, say,
eight or more firms, even minor fluctuations around the static Nash equilibrium may end up with subjects
incurring losses.
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n = 2 n = 4 n = 6
Static Nash qi 33.00 19.80 14.14
Symmetric collusive qi 24.75 12.38 8.25
Static Nash Πi 1089.00 392.04 200.02
Symmetric collusive Πi 1225.13 612.56 408.38
Minimum discount factor, δ 0.529 0.610 0.671
Gain from talking, ∆Π 272.25 882.09 1250.13
Table 2: Predictions. Notes: “Nash qi” refers to the firm-level output in the one-shot
equilibrium, “Collusive qi” refers to firm-level output in the symmetric joint-profit maximum,
δ is the minimum discount factor required in a repeated game with Nash trigger, and the
“Gain from talking” refers to the extra profit firms earn when colluding summed across all
firms.
The conventional wisdom that fewer firms will find it easier to collude can be derived
formally in the repeated game (see the Appendix). Row five of Table 2 shows the minimum
discount factor, δ, required to sustain the symmetric joint-profit maximum as a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium in the infinitely repeated game. This incentive constraint is a
condition that necessarily has to be met for the collusive outcome to be subgame perfect,
regardless of whether players communicate explicitly. Furthermore, such incentive conditions
are often interpreted as an indicator of how “difficult” collusion is. Thus we have theoretical
support for:
Hypothesis 1. The fewer the firms, the easier they find it to collude both (i) tacitly and
(ii) explicitly.
Experimental evidence as well as antitrust practice suggests that firms benefit from
talking (see the introduction and the end of this section). We thus formally hypothesize that
the gain from talking is positive:
Hypothesis 2. Communication has a collusive effect.
We now turn to the main point of the paper, the gain from communicating. Let πChati ,
i = 1, ..., n denote the profit each firm makes when engaging in explicit communication, and
let πNo−Chati , i = 1, ..., n, denote the profit without explicit communication.
8 Then the gain
8See, for example, Aubert et al. (2007) for just such a model of cartel formation. In their model, Cartel-
like communication is detected and fined with a certain probability. We will keep these factors outside our
model.
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from communication for a market of n firms is
∆Π =
n∑
i=1
(
πChati − πNo−Chati
)
. (1)
In words, this is the amount of money the firms in an industry would put on the table in
order to be able to talk.
Standard repeated-game theory is probably not well-equipped to predict a gain from
communicating (Harrington 2008, Whinston 2008). The incentive constraint of the repeated
game (see Appendix) merely reflects the incentives to deviate from a given collusive equilib-
rium. Whether firms coordinate on such an equilibrium with or without communication is
immaterial. Importantly, even if it turned out that πChati and π
No−Chat
i decline in the number
of firms, this does not suggest a relationship between n and ∆Π. The difference between two
monotonically declining functions can be anything, so ∆Π could be increasing, decreasing
or non-monotonic in n.
In order to get more structure into this problem, we assume that without communi-
cation firms do not manage to sustain collusive output levels at all whereas they perfectly
collude on the monopoly output when they are allowed to talk. If so, the profits in rows three
and four of Table 2 would occur and we can calculate ∆Π (see row six, and the Appendix
for a general analysis). We formalize:
Hypothesis 3. The gain from talking, ∆Π, (i) increases monotonically in n, and (ii) it does
so at a decreasing rate.
Note again how δ and ∆Π capture the ambiguous and apparently contradictory notion
of “facilitating collusion”. The minimum discount factor indeed suggests that fewer firms
find it easier to collude. The gain from explicit chat, however, is higher for four and six
Cournot firms than for duopolies.9 Therefore, even though fewer firms may find it easier to
collude, this does by no means imply that there will be more cartels with fewer firms.
To what extent do we need to modify our hypotheses on ∆Π in light of previous
Cournot experiments? For Cournot markets with communication, Huck et al. (2004) found
that duopolies show some level of tacit coordination, but oligopolies with four or more
firms converge to the Nash equilibrium or are even more competitive.10 Evidence on n-firm
Cournot oligopoly with communication is less abundant but Normann et al. (2015) analyze
three-firm Cournot markets with (unstructured) communication; they report near perfect
9With perfect Bertrand competition,
∑
πNo−Chati would be zero and
∑
πChati would be at the profit
maximum. But then ∆Π would be constant, regardless of n.
10Consistent with the experimental evidence, Li and Lyons (2012) find for telecommunication industries
that market structures with more than three firms lead to major improvements in competitiveness.
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monopolization. Gomez-Martinez et al. (2016) report lab experiments with differentiated
Cournot competition and find that subjects in four-firm markets cooperate close to the
joint-profit maximizing level. Waichmann, Requate and Siang (2014) confirm the above
results without communication but observe less collusion with talk. While acknowledging
that we know little about Cournot markets with more than four firms, it appears the existing
experimental evidence strengthens our hypothesis that ∆Π increases in n.
4 Procedures
We provided written experimental instructions which informed subjects of all the features
of the market (the instructions are available in the Appendix). Subjects were told they were
representing one of two, four or six firms, respectively, in a market. The instructions notified
the participants of the market parameters in an informal manner. Two concrete examples
illustrated the profit calculations.
In every period, subjects had to enter a quantity ∈ {0, 100} in a computer interface.11
Once all subjects had made their decisions, the period ended and a screen displayed the
quantity choices of all firms and the market price. The screen also displayed the individual
payoff of the current period and the accumulated payoffs up to that point but not the payoffs
of the other firms.
Treatments were incentivized and payments were made as follows. Since losses are
possible in this game, we decided to give subjects an initial capital corresponding to four
euros. We used an experimental currency unit (“Taler”) and different exchange rates for
each market, namely 2,000 Taler for one euro for the duopolies, 1,000 Taler for the four-firm
markets and 750 Taler for the six-firm markets. The varying exchange rates are warranted
here because the pie (or the market size) is constant in this experiment whereas the number
of players is not. Payments were made at the end and in cash and consisted of the initial
capital and the sum of the payoffs attained during the course of the experiment.
Subjects were recruited from a pool of potential participants using the online system
ORSEE (Greiner 2015). The experiments were computerized, using z-Tree (Fischbacher
2007), and were conducted at the DICElab of Heinrich-Heine University in 2013 and 2014.
A total of 180 subjects participated in 10 sessions (two duopoly sessions and four sessions each
for the n = 4 and n = 6 treatments). Sessions lasted between 45 and 65 minutes. Average
earnings were 15.39 euros and ranged from 9.26 euros (No-Com-6) to 18.86 (Com-2).
11As is well known, there are additional equilibria in Cournot oligopoly when the action space is discrete
(Holt 1985). These additional equilibria are close to the prediction made in (3) (at most one unit distance)
and, moreover, may imply the same average quantities. For example, with n = 2, q1 = 34 and q2 = 32 are
mutual best replies but, the average is 33, as with continuous actions.
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5 Results
5.1 Treatment Effects
Table 3 reports average quantities and profits conditional on the number of firms and whether
or not communication was possible. It also reports the Cournot-Nash benchmark and the
symmetric joint-profit maximum.
Average quantities in the No-Chat condition are significantly below the Cournot-Nash
level in n = 2 (z = 2.666; p = 0.008, Wilcoxon signed-rank test (WSR); not statistically
different from Nash in n = 4 (z = −0.770; p = 0.441, WSR test) and slightly above Nash for
n = 6 (z = 1.782; p = 0.075, WSR test). These findings are consistent with results reported
in Huck et al. (2004).
n = 2 n = 4 n = 6
No-Chat Chat No-Chat Chat No-Chat Chat
qi 28.86 24.84 19.22 12.01 14.94 9.01
(2.95) (0.86) (2.35) (0.90) (0.74) (0.95)
prediction 33.00 24.75 19.80 12.38 14.14 8.25
πi 1130.66 1214.45 386.26 596.41 164.23 382.19
(76.29) (9.62) (110.82) (24.59) (33.85) (36.15)
prediction 1089.00 1225.13 392.04 612.56 200.02 408.38
# obs 9 9 9 9 6 6
Table 3: Average quantities and profits, (std. dev.) and prediction (static Nash for No-Chat,
symmetric joint-profit maximum for Chat).
We further observe a positive relationship between the number of firms and industry
output. A Jonckheere-Terpstra test (JT) rejected the null of the joint equality of outputs
against an ordered alternative in either direction (J∗ = 2.089, p = 0.038). This is consistent
with Hypothesis 1 (i).
Observation 1 (i): Without communication, the fewer the firms, the easier it is to collude
tacitly.
With communication, average quantities were very close to, and not statistically
different from, the collusion benchmark in all market structures (n = 2: z = 0.771, p = 0.441;
n = 4: z = −1.007, p = 0.314; n = 6: z = 1.572, p = 0.116, WSR, test). Along the
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same lines, we no longer observe any statistically significant relationship between industry
output and the number of firms (JT, J∗ = 0.000, p = 0.500, for either of the two ordered
alternatives).
Observation 1 (ii): With communication, the number of firms does not affect the level of
collusion.
Consistent with Hypothesis 2, allowing participants to communicate leads to a sig-
nificant reduction in average quantities across all treatments (n = 2: z = 2.475, p = 0.013;
n = 4: z = 3.576, p < 0.001; n = 6: z = 2.882, p = 0.004, Wilcoxon rank-sum, WRS, test).
Consequently, firms earned higher profits in the Chat conditions than the No-Chat condi-
tions (n = 2: z = 2.209, p = 0.027; n = 4: z = 3.488, p < 0.001; n = 6: z = 2.882, p = 0.004,
WRS test).
Observation 2: The opportunity to communicate leads to lower quantities and higher
profits.
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Figure 2: Mean and standard deviation of quantities. Observations of the No-Chat treat-
ments are denoted by ×, and  denote observations in the Chat treatments. Black symbols
refers to n = 2, dark gray to n = 4 and light gray to n = 6
Careful observation of Table 3 shows that communication not only decreases average
firm quantities but it also reduces their dispersion. Figure 2 provides visual confirmation of
this, each (independent) group being one observation. Conditional on group size, average
12
quantities are lower under communication, and dispersion is also lower. This suggests that
communication allowed subjects to coordinate more easily on a vector of quantities, as
opposed to the case where communication was not allowed.
Another metric of collusion is the rate at which firms were able to coordinate on the
symmetric joint-profit maximizing output, see Table 4. Referring to this output as qCi and
given the prediction is not always an integer, we define an outcome as perfectly collusive if
all firms in a market post quantities within one unit of qCi , that is,
⌊
qCi
⌋
≤ qi ≤
⌈
qCi
⌉
∀i.12
In the absence of communication, only duopolists managed to coordinate on the joint-profit
maximum outcome, and even then, only about a quarter of the time. (This figure is very close
to what Mermer, Müller and Suetens, 2016, observe for their strategic-substitutes duopolies).
In the four-firm and six-firm markets, firms never achieved perfect collusion. In contrast,
when communication was available, coordination on the joint profit maximizing quantity
was much more frequent. The greatest coordination benefit from communication is drawn
from four-firm markets.
n = 2 n = 4 n = 6
No-Chat 49 23% 0 0% 0 0%
Chat 137 63% 144 67% 71 49%
Gain 88 40% 144 67% 71 49%
Table 4: Absolute and relative frequency of perfect collusion
5.2 Dynamics
We now examine how quantity choices changed over the course of the experiment. We
begin by looking at whether or not individual players responded to quantities posted by
other players in the previous round, and how communication affected this. To do this, we
estimated the following Random Effects GLS model with robust standard errors, clustered
at the market level.13
qi,t = β0 + β1Chat + β2Q−i,t−1 + β3(Chat × Q−i,t−1) + β4t + β5(t × Chat) + εi,t, (2)
where qi,t is the output chosen by player i in round t of the experiment, Chat is a dummy
variable for sessions in which communication was allowed between participants, Q−i,t−1 is
12Widening this interval by one unit does not change the qualitative pattern of results in terms of the
relative gains from communication.
13The choice of the Random Effects estimator was driven by our use of time-invariant regressors.
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DV: qi,t n = 2 n = 4 n = 6
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Chat -6.28∗ -6.34∗ -12.60∗∗∗ -12.17∗∗∗ -6.97∗∗∗ -8.45∗∗∗
(3.37) (3.62) (2.88) (2.69) (2.41) (2.32)
Q−i,t−1 0.23
∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.01
(0.08) (0.08) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Chat×Q−i,t−1 0.12 0.12 0.18∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.04 -0.04
(0.11) (0.11) (0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)
t 0.002 0.06 -0.06∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.08) (0.02)
t× Chat 0.005 -0.02 0.10∗∗
(0.07) (0.08) (0.04)
Constant 22.29∗∗∗ 22.25∗∗∗ 16.35∗∗∗ 15.82∗∗∗ 13.45∗∗∗ 14.55∗∗∗
(2.67) (2.77) (2.40) (2.32) (2.31) (2.26)
N 828 828 1,656 1,656 1,656 1,656
R2 0.17 0.17 0.32 0.33 0.18 0.18
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗: respectively p < 0.01, p < 0.05, p < 0.10.
Robust standard errors clustered at the market level in parentheses.
Table 5: Random effects GLS estimates of quantity
the total output selected by all other players in the market in round t− 1.
Table 5 summarizes the estimation results. We provide estimation results for each
treatment separately for ease of exposition. To test for treatment differences, we ran the
same model estimation where all regressors were interacted with a set of treatment dummies.
The results from that joint estimation can be found in the Appendix.
We start by examining the restricted version of our model, in which we do not consider
time trends (that is, β4 = β5 = 0). The coefficients on Chat in all three regressions confirm
the analysis of Table 3: communication leads to lower average quantity. We do detect
interesting differences in the three treatments with respect to how individuals reacted to
aggregate quantities in the previous round. In the n = 2 case, we observe a positive and
highly significant coefficient on Q−i,t−1, and a non-significant interaction of Q−i,t−1 with
Chat. Players therefore respond to higher quantity by their rival in the previous round with
higher quantity in the present round, suggesting a collusive relationship over time between
the two players, and one which does not require communication in order to be effective. In
the n = 4 case, that positive relationship is only present in the presence of communication,
suggesting that collusion is perhaps harder to achieve in larger groups. Finally, in the n = 6
case, we do not observe any relationship between qi,t and Q−i,t−1 either in the presence or
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absence of communication.
We next consider the unrestricted model in which we allow for the presence of time
trends, both in the intercept and in its interaction with the Chat dummy, which capture the
extent to which average quantity is allowed to vary over the course of the experiment in the
two communication regimes. In the n = 2 and n = 4, the coefficients on these time trends
are not statistically significant. This suggests that the relationship between qi,t and Q−i,t−1
(if any) is relatively stable over time in both group sizes. The same is not the case for the
n = 6: introducing the time trends increases the absolute size of the coefficient on Chat,
which is now larger. We also observe a negative and significant time trend and a positive
significant interaction with Chat; both are small in magnitude and seem to be dominated
by the intercept effect. That is, the ability to communicate leads to a very large drop in
output, which seems to increase slightly over time. This is congruent with the possibility
that subjects were approaching the collusive output from below. In any event, players react
to past changes in the aggregate output produced by other players in their market in the
past round in a manner consistent with collusion.
As a caveat, we note that, due to the experimental design, we did not collect subjects’
contemporaneous beliefs about the output choices made by the other firms in a given period.
It is quite reasonable to expect that these beliefs would be an important determinant of
quantity choices. If those beliefs are positively correlated with past choices, then we would
expect the estimated coefficients on Q−i,t−1 to be biased upwards because of omitted variable
bias. In other words, our econometric results might be over-estimating the effect past choices
by other firms have on current output choices.
Figure 3 illustrates the analysis presented so far. It shows the estimated per round
average quantity for the six treatments. The left panel concerns the No-Chat treatments,
while the right panel concerns the Chat conditions. Conditional on the communication
regime, we observe clear mean differences across treatments, which remain constant over
time. It is quite clear from the estimated 95% confidence intervals that there is much more
variability in per-round output in the No-Chat treatments than in the Chat treatments.
5.3 The gain from communication
So far, what we found suggests (more or less) Nash-equilibrium play without communication
and near-perfect symmetric collusion with chat. This was consistent with Hypotheses 1 (i)
and 2 but not supporting Hypothesis 1 (ii).
We now put these findings together in terms of the gain from talking formalized in
Hypothesis 3. Table 6 displays the estimation results of a simple treatment-effects interaction
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Figure 3: Figure 3: Time series of average prices. Note: solid lines denote estimated per
round means, and dashed lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. Black, gray and blue
correspond to n = 2, 4, 6, respectively.
model with the per round industry profit
∑
i πi,t as the dependent variable. We estimate the
model using Random Effects GLS with robust standard errors clustered at the market level.
The difference in profits resulting from communication, ∆Π, is reflected by the interaction
terms n× Chat. This difference is higher in n = 4 than in n = 2 (χ2(1) = 8.41, p = 0.004).
It is also higher in n = 6 than in n = 4 (χ2(1) = 19.04, p < 0.0001). This is support for
Hypothesis 3 which suggests that ∆Π increases in n.14
Observation 3: The gain from communication, ∆Π, (i) increases in n, and it does so (ii)
at a decreasing rate.
It is informative to compare the results from this experiment to those of Fonseca and
Normann (2012), who study the effect of communication in Bertrand markets in markets
with two, four, six and eight firms. Unlike our paper, Fonseca and Normann (2012) find
an inverted-u relationship between the number of firms and the absolute gains from com-
munication. The difference in results is a function of what firms do when communication is
available. In the Bertrand environment without communication, average prices are collusive
for n = 2 but they are very close to Nash for n = 4 and n = 6. We observe the same pattern
in the Cournot environment. Communication was very effective in the Cournot markets ir-
respective of the number of firms, as the average posted quantity was very close to the joint
14Observation 3, which can be seen as our main result, is already reflected in average euro payments. When
we calculate the difference in average profit per period per participant, explicit communication increased
profit per period per participant by 0.04 euro in the n = 2 markets, by 0.21 euro in the n = 4 markets,
and by 0.29 euro in the n = 6 markets, highlighting our conclusion that the gain from explicit collusion is
increasing in n, but at a decreasing rate.
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DV:
∑
πi,t
n = 2× Chat 167.58∗∗∗
(48.95)
n = 4 -716.28∗∗∗
(149.21)
n = 4× Chat 840.61∗∗∗
(144.52)
n = 6 -1275.92∗∗∗
(90.75)
n = 6× Chat 1307.74∗∗∗
(112.15)
Constant 2261.32∗∗∗
(48.57)
R2 0.51
N 1,152
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗: p < 0.01, p < 0.05, p < 0.10.
Robust SEs clustered at the market level in parentheses.
Table 6: Random effects GLS estimates of firm-level and market-level profits as a function
of number of firms
profit maximising level. In contrast, the Bertrand environment led cooperation to break
down under communication as firm numbers increased. There are two possible reasons for
this discrepancy in results. While the monopoly price in the Bertrand game studied by Fon-
seca and Normann (2012) was a natural focal point, any deviation by at least one firm led to
all other firms earning zero profit for the period. In contrast, the quadratic profit function
in the Cournot game means that firms have a harder task to find the joint-profit maximum
quantity from a cognitive perspective, but deviations from the collusive equilibrium are less
punitive for the cheated firms.
5.4 Text-mining analysis of the communication data
In this section we analyze the language used in the Chat variants in more detail. In particular,
we wish to understand the extent to which the number of firms affects the language used,
and what kind of language is useful to support collusion. To this effect, we employ text
mining methods (Moellers, Normann and Snyder, 2017).15 Text-mining methods extract
keywords from a body of text, referred to as a corpus. We will compare the most frequently
used keywords for two corpora in order to find out how the corpora (the chats) differ. To
be more precise, we will use Huerta’s (2008) relative rank difference which tells us which
15For alternative methods of text analysis, see Kimborough et al. (2008) or Houser and Xiao (2011).
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keywords are comparatively more frequently used in corpus c relative to c′. Formally, we
measure the keyness of word w in corpus c relative to c′ by generating ranks rc(w) for all
words w in corpus c according to frequency (and in descending order). The difference in the
rank of w in corpus c relative to corpus c′ is defined as
rdc
′
c =
|rc′(w)− rc(w)|
rc(w)
.
As Huerta (2008, p. 967) points out, the rd score “denotes some sort of percent change in
rank. This also means that this function is less sensitive to small changes in frequency in the
case of frequent words and to small changes in rank in case of infrequent words.” In other
words, we are not concerned about cardinal measures, but ordinal measures, making the
analysis distribution-free. This measure means that a unit change on the top of the ranking,
say from first to second, will have a higher rd score than a change from 50th to 51st. This is
intuitive because changes at the top of the ranking are more important than changes at the
bottom of the ranking, since the former apply to very frequently-used words, as opposed to
the latter. Had we wanted to give changes a more equal weighting throughout the ranking,
we would have raised the denominator to the power of larger than one. Also, a large rd score
implies a large leap in the rankings from one corpus to the other, meaning that it is almost
never used in one context to being very frequently used in the other.
In our analysis, we always compare the difference in the rank of w in corpus c relative
to corpus c′ and corpus c′ relative to corpus c to get a complete picture. We restrict ourselves
to keywords that are among the top 50 most common in corpus c, avoiding keywords with a
high rdc
′
c that are nevertheless rarely used. We omit conjunctions, prepositions, and articles
and we only report keywords with rdc
′
c > 1.
Table 7 reveals some interesting insights into the differences in chat when it comes
to the number of firms. It is instructive to look at the words that have the highest rank
differential in the pairwise comparisons. In duopolies, ‘25’ is discussed relatively more often
than in the other market structures; ‘12’ is relatively more frequent in four-firm markets;
and ‘8’ is relatively more frequently used in six-firm markets than elsewhere. This is hardly
surprising: these numbers are the joint-profit maximizing outputs. It illustrates that subjects
identified what the profit-maximizing output was, and attempted to coordinate on that value.
The relatively high frequency of other close values could be an indication of learning or trial
and error — recall that subjects did not have a payoff table. Furthermore, markets with
n = 4 and n = 6 cannot produce the joint-profit maximizing aggregate output of 49 or 50
symmetrically. Hence, they also talk about targets other than ‘12’ or ‘8’.
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two vs. four two vs. six four vs. six
n = 2 n = 4 n = 2 n = 6 n = 4 n = 6
word rd word rd word rd word rd word rd word rd
25 261.0 12 716.0 25 581.0 8 606.0 12 70.0 8 151.0
26 50.5 11 78.7 26 51.9 9 357.5 13 20.6 7 50.6
both 38.1 13 64.2 24 36.5 7 26.1 11 10.2 9 15.5
24 35.6 10 27.8 23 31.3 all 23.0 :) 4.0 B 4.9
27 27.4 9 20.7 27 28.1 B 22.1 20 3.9 5 3.2
23 21.7 everyone 11.0 both 15.4 10 22.0 oneself 3.1 one 3.0
50 16.5 15 4.9 I 5.0 A 16.9s already 2.3 6 2.5
let 7.8 each 2.7 times 4.0 D 4.6 each 1.3 stay 2.2
I 5.0 works 2.0 50 3.8 5 3.1 times 1.1 do 2.1
think 3.8 gives 1.6 you 2.4 one 2.5 but 1.2
have 2.9 :) 1.5 let 2.4 do 1.8 A 1.1
stay 2.3 does 1.3 20 2.0 only 1.7
you 2.1 how 1.1 think 1.8 to 1.4
or 1.9 ;) 1.7 still 1.1
times 1.4 still 1.7
but 1.1 better 1.5
for 1.1 or 1.5
1.1 than 1.2
1.1 have 1.2
Table 7: Text-mining analysis. We report words with absolute rank rc ≤ 50 and relative rank differential rd ≥ 1.
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A conspicuous finding between duopolies on the one hand and the four- and six-firm
treatments on the other is the relatively more frequent use of ‘both’ for n = 2, and the
relatively more frequent use of ‘everyone’, ‘one’, or ‘all’ for n = 4 and n = 6.16 These words
were presumably used in the context of invoking a collective decision, or attempting to invoke
a group identity. It is interesting to note that ‘I’ and ‘you’ were used more often in duopolies
than in the other two treatments. This could signify that subjects may have attempted to
coordinate on strategies that involved asymmetric output choices. In contrast, subjects the
six-firm markets used capital letters (individual subjects were identified by capital letters on
the screen) more. While duopolists may not have needed to use letters (hence their frequent
usage of ‘you’), the use of letters in a large group indicates a particular individual was singled
out by participants. One conjectures this was done as a reprimand for bad behavior in a
previous round, or perhaps less likely, as a compliment for abiding to an agreement.
Another interesting target for language analysis is to compare groups that successfully
colluded to groups that did not. A problem is that virtually all groups can be considered
collusive. For example, 21 of 24 groups have an average quantity of plus ten percent on top
of the joint-profit maximizing output. And even the remaining three groups (all of which
have n = 6) have average outputs closer to the joint profit maximum than to the static
Nash equilibrium. The text-mining analysis still leads to some insights. We produce the
comprehensive analysis in Table 9 in the Appendix and mention some conspicuous findings
here. The successful groups (according to the above criterion), unsurprisingly, mention more
frequently the collusive quantity targets “13”, suitable for n = 4, and “25”, suitable for
n = 2. The three “unsuccessful” groups used relatively frequently non-suitable (for n = 6)
quantity targets like “7” or “10”, and “please”, indicating disagreement or uncertainty about
choices.
In Table 10 in the Appendix, we also provide a ranking of the words used most
frequently in absolute terms. The table shows that, unsurprisingly, some words are frequently
used throughout (“I”, “ok”), but the quantities of the symmetric collusive outputs also
appear at the top of the list. Since the collusive outputs differ across treatments, they have
a particularly high rd score. For example, the quantity “12” is the most frequently used
term with n = 4 but is never used with n = 2. These absolute frequencies imply a rather
large relative rank difference of rdn=2n=4 = 716.0. Intuitively, also more moderate differences
in ranks can imply a substantial rd score when they score high in absolute frequency. “I”
is the most frequent word with n = 2 and it is the sixth most frequent word with n = 4,
suggesting rdn=4n=2 = 5.0, that is, the relative rank difference is five.
16The “one” in the list of words refers to the German “einer,” as in “one of us”.
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6 Discussion
The main research question of this paper is to quantify firms’ additional profit from talking
explicitly for Cournot oligopolies. We observe an increasing and concave relationship between
the number of firms and this gain. In other words, markets with more firms find it more
profitable to talk than markets with fewer firms.
Our finding is, on the one hand, consistent with the meta study of Balliet (2010). On
the other hand, Fonseca and Normann (2012) found an inverse-u shaped relationship the
authors should add between the number of firms and the incentive to collude. This shows
that strategic substitutes vs. complements may matter (see also Mermer, Müller and Suetens,
2016, for duopolies without talk) regarding the incentive to talk, as may asymmetries between
firms (see Harrington et al. 2016). In any event, it cannot be taken for granted that the
conventional wisdom—fewer firms find it easier to collude—reflects the gain from explicitly
talking and therefore the frequency of cartels.
We furthermore find evidence confirming the role of communication as a catalyst
to cooperation in repeated market games. Communication leads to a reduction in average
quantities, and lower dispersion, suggesting that it facilitates coordination. The dynamics of
output choices shows there are differences in the way communication helps collusion as the
number of firms increases. In duopolies, the effect of communication primarily materializes
through a level effect. We find dynamic output adjustments where firms positively respond
to the quantity posted by the other firm in the previous period. Those adjustments are equal
in magnitude in the Chat and No-Chat conditions. In contrast, the data from the four-firm
markets shows dynamic quantity adjustments in the Chat conditions only. Coordinating on
the profit maximizing output is a more difficult proposition when done by four firms, and
communication appears to help. A still different pattern emerges in the six-firm markets.
There, we find no dynamic output adjustments in response to other firms’ behavior. Instead,
we find a simple time trend effect, suggesting that communication only allowed subjects to
recognize the advantages of lower quantities, while not allowing them to adjust outputs
optimally — which is consistent with the observation that aggregate output in the six-firm
markets with communication were substantially below the joint-profit maximum.
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Appendix 1: General Model
Underlying our design is a homogenous-good Cournot oligopoly with n firms as players.
Firms choose quantities qi ∈ [0,∞), i = 1, ...n. Let Q =
∑n
i qi. Inverse demand is linear such
that p = max{a − Q, 0}, where p is the market price. Firms produce at constant marginal
costs of c. Profits are denoted by Πi = (p− c)qi.
The two benchmarks we use are the static Nash equilibrium and the symmetric joint-
profit maximum. In the static Nash equilibrium, each firm produces qi = (a − c)/(n + 1)
and earns a profit of (
a− c
n+ 1
)2
. (3)
For n = 1, we obtain the monopoly output, qi = (a − c)/2. The symmetric joint-profit
maximum has therefore each of the n firms producing qi = (a − c)/2n, yielding a profit for
each firm equal to
(a− c)2
4n
. (4)
We now show how the joint-profit maximum can be sustained as a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium (SGPNE) in a repeated game. Consider an infinitely repeated version of
the above stage game. Firms discount future profits by a factor δ ∈ (0, 1). Suppose that
firms aim at maintaining the symmetric joint payoff maximum as an SGPNE with a simple
Nash trigger strategy. If firm i deviates, its best response is to produce (a− c) (n+ 1) /4n,
yielding a defection profit of ((a− c) (n+ 1) /4n)2. For the symmetric joint payoff maximum
to be an SGPNE, the stream of discounted collusive profits has to be at least as high as the
profit from a one-time deviation followed by a grim (Nash) punishment path in the future,
that is:
(a− c)2
(1− δ)4n
≥ (a− c)
2 (n+ 1)2
16n2
+
δ(a− c)2
(1− δ)(n+ 1)2
(5)
We can solve this inequality for δ. The discount factor has to be at least
δ ≥ (n+ 1)
2
(n+ 1)2 + 4n
≡ δ (6)
for cooperation to be a subgame perfect equilibrium.
We find ∂δ/∂n > 0, so the minimum discount factor increases in n. The incentive
constraint (6) is a condition that necessarily has to be met in repeated games, regardless
of whether players communicate explicitly. Furthermore, conditions like (6) are often inter-
preted as an indicator of how “difficult” collusion is. Thus we have theoretical support for
Hypothesis 1 in the main text. We note that Hypothesis 1 holds for other collusive equi-
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libria with outputs below the joint-profit maximum. It also holds for other (more severe)
punishment strategies.
Our Hypothesis 2 in the main text is based on experimental evidence and antitrust
practice. It is not based on formal theory.
Hypothesis 3 is about the quantification of the gain from communication. We assume
as an illustration that, without communication, firms earn static Nash profits as in (3)
whereas firms perfectly coordinate on the monopoly output when they are allowed to talk
as in (4). Thus we have:
πNo−Chati =
(
a− c
n+ 1
)2
(7)
and
πChati =
(a− c)2
4n
. (8)
Then, the gain from talking for this industry is:
∆Π =
(a− c)2
4
− n
(
a− c
n+ 1
)2
=
(a− c)2
4
(n− 1)2
(n+ 1)2
. (9)
From ∂∆Π/∂n > 0, this expression increases monotonically in n, and it approaches (a −
c)2/4—the maximum joint profit—for n → ∞. In words, (9) suggests that the gain from
talking increases in n. Furthermore, ∂2∆Π/∂n2 < 0. That is, ∆Π increases in n at a
decreasing rate, as formalized in Hypothesis 3.
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Appendix 2: Instructions (translated from the original
German versions)
Duopolies No-Chat
Welcome to our experiment!
Please read these instructions carefully. If you have a question, please raise your hand
and direct them at us. We ask you that you speak to your neighbors and that you keep quiet
during the entire experiment! If you do not follow this rule, you may be excluded from the
experiment and payment. In this experiment you will repeatedly make decisions that will
earn you real money. How much you earn depends on your decisions and on the decisions of
other participants. All decisions you make will be treated anonymously.
In this experiment you will represent a firm which produces and sells one and the
same product, as does one other firm in the market. Both firms will always have to make
one decision, namely to decide what quantity they wish to produce. The costs of production
are 1 Taler per unit (this holds for all firms). Furthermore, your capacity allows you to have
a maximum output of 100 units in each period. The following important rule holds: the
larger the total quantity of both firms, the smaller the price in the market. More precisely,
for each additional unit of output, the price will decrease by one Taler. Moreover, the price
will be zero from a certain amount of total output upwards. The price can be 100 Taler at
most and cannot be smaller than zero.
Example 1: You and the other firm produce 40 units each, the total output is thus
80 units. This results in a price of 100 – 80 = 20 Taler and you get one profit of (20 – 1) *
40 = 760 Taler.
Example 2: You and the other firm produce 20 units each, the total output is thus
40 units. This results in a price of 100 – 40 = 60 Taler and you make a profit of (60 – 1) *
20 = 1180 Taler.
Note that you can also make losses. You will start with a starting capital of 16,000
Taler, which also serves as a show-up fee. After each round, you will be informed you of the
amount the other participant has produced and how much your own profit is. At least 20
periods are played. Once the 20th period is over, the computer will decide with a virtual
cube whether or not to continue. If a six comes up, the experiment is over. For any other
number, the experiment will be continued.
You will be constantly matched with the same participant. At the end of the ex-
periment, you will be told of your earnings in Taler which correspond to your payout. The
following conversion rate applies: You will receive one euro for every 2,000 Taler.
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Additional Instructions for Duopolies No-Chat
During the experiment, you will have the opportunity to communicate to the other firm in
your market. In the first period, you will have one minute available for this; from period two
and in all subsequent periods, 30 seconds will be available. For this purpose, you will have
a chat-box on your screen which can be used to send and receive messages. Only the other
person with whom you have been matched with can read your messages. You can send any
number of messages. There are only two restrictions on messages: you must not identify
yourself (via messages on age, gender, etc.) and you must not insult the other participants.
After one minute, or from the second period on after 30 seconds, the chat window
will be closed and you must decide on the quantity you want to produce and sell in that
period.
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Appendix 3: Additional Data Analysis
30
DV: qi,t (1) (2)
Chat -7.85∗∗∗ -7.90∗∗
(2.96) (3.14)
Chat× n = 4 -7.07 -4.22
(4.88) (4.10)
Chat× n = 6 0.83 -0.58
(3.78) (3.87)
Q−i,t−1 0.17
∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06)
Q−i,t−1 × n = 4 -0.14∗ -0.12∗
(0.07) (0.07)
Q−i,t−1 × n = 6 -0.15∗∗ -0.15∗∗
(0.06) (0.06)
Chat×Q−i,t−1 0.17∗ 0.17∗
(0.10) (0.10)
Chat×Q−i,t−1 × n = 4 0.03 -0.003
(0.12) (.12)
Chat×Q−i,t−1 × n = 6 -0.13 -0.15∗∗
(0.11) (0.06)
t 0.01
(0.06)
t× n = 4 0.05
(0.10)
t× n = 6 -0.07
(0.07)
t× Chat 0.002
(0.07)
t× Chat× n = 4 -0.02
(0.11)
t× Chat× n = 6 0.10
(0.08)
n = 4 -5.56 -8.43∗∗∗
(4.08) (2.99)
n = 6 -10.70∗∗∗ -9.58∗∗∗
(3.00) (2.93)
Constant 24.19∗∗∗ 24.15∗∗∗
(1.98) (1.93)
N 3,772
R2 0.57
Table 8: Random effects GLS Estimates
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collusive non-collusive
word rd word rd
13 21.8 7 22.3
25 16.3 please 6.8
you 7.7 5 3.9
20 6.7 6 2.9
11 5.8 10 1.7
I 4.0 still 1.6
still 3.4 9 1.5
does 2.8 15 1.4
12 2.2 was 1.1
and 2.1 us 1.0
:) 2.0
times 1.4
only 1.4
if 1.1
Table 9: Text-mining analysis for collusive vs. non-collusive groups (the latter defined as
failing to restrict output below the joint-profit maximizing level plus 10 percent). We report
words with absolute rank rc ≤ 50 and relative rank differential rd ≥ 1.
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n = 2 n = 4 n = 6
I 12 8
25 :) 9
ok ok ok
yes 10 all
:) yes 10
we I I
times we yes
is all we
so 11 is
or so :)
not 13 not
still is 7
more and and
and not so
then too now
what then do
too times also
also it what
you now but
but still it
;) good more
26 what was
with more at
good each or
if if too
now 20 stay
stay was good
it also with
both or B
for ;) further
24 still still
was as even
one 9 then
better with one
23 continue times
Table 10: Ranking of absolutely most frequently observed words in each treatment.
PREVIOUS DISCUSSION PAPERS 
 
289 Fonseca, Miguel A., Li, Yan and Normann, Hans-Theo, Why Factors Facilitating 
Collusion May Not Predict Cartel Occurrence – Experimental Evidence, May 2018. 
Forthcoming in: Southern Economic Journal. 
288 Benesch, Christine, Loretz, Simon, Stadelmann, David and Thomas, Tobias, Media 
Coverage and Immigration Worries: Econometric Evidence, April 2018. 
287 Dewenter, Ralf, Linder, Melissa and Thomas, Tobias, Can Media Drive the 
Electorate? The Impact of Media Coverage on Party Affiliation and Voting Intentions, 
April 2018. 
286 Jeitschko, Thomas D., Kim, Soo Jin and Yankelevich, Aleksandr, A Cautionary Note 
on Using Hotelling Models in Platform Markets, April 2018. 
285 Baye, Irina, Reiz, Tim and Sapi, Geza, Customer Recognition and Mobile Geo-
Targeting, March 2018. 
284 Schaefer, Maximilian, Sapi, Geza and Lorincz, Szabolcs, The Effect of Big Data on 
Recommendation Quality. The Example of Internet Search, March 2018. 
283 Fischer, Christian and Normann, Hans-Theo, Collusion and Bargaining in Asymmetric 
Cournot Duopoly – An Experiment, March 2018. 
282 Friese, Maria, Heimeshoff, Ulrich and Klein, Gordon, Property Rights and Transaction 
Costs – The Role of Ownership and Organization in German Public Service Provision, 
February 2018. 
281 Hunold, Matthias and Shekhar, Shiva, Supply Chain Innovations and Partial 
Ownership, February 2018. 
280 Rickert, Dennis, Schain, Jan Philip and Stiebale, Joel, Local Market Structure and 
Consumer Prices: Evidence from a Retail Merger, January 2018. 
279 Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus and Wenzel, Tobias, Focusing and Framing of Risky 
Alternatives, December 2017.                                                                              
Forthcoming in: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 
278 Hunold, Matthias, Kesler, Reinhold, Laitenberger, Ulrich and Schlütter, Frank, 
Evaluation of Best Price Clauses in Online Hotel Booking, December 2017             
(First Version October 2016).                                                                                     
Forthcoming in: Journal of Industrial Organization. 
277 Haucap, Justus, Thomas, Tobias and Wohlrabe, Klaus, Publication Performance vs. 
Influence: On the Questionable Value of Quality Weighted Publication Rankings, 
December 2017. 
276 Haucap, Justus, The Rule of Law and the Emergence of Market Exchange: A New 
Institutional Economic Perspective, December 2017.                                              
Published in: von Alemann, U., D. Briesen & L. Q. Khanh (eds.), The State of Law: 
Comparative Perspectives on the Rule of Law, Düsseldorf University Press: Düsseldorf 2017, 
pp. 143-172. 
275 Neyer, Ulrike and Sterzel, André, Capital Requirements for Government Bonds – 
Implications for Bank Behaviour and Financial Stability, December 2017. 
274 Deckers, Thomas, Falk, Armin, Kosse, Fabian, Pinger, Pia and Schildberg-Hörisch, 
Hannah, Socio-Economic Status and Inequalities in Children’s IQ and Economic 
Preferences, November 2017. 
273 Defever, Fabrice, Fischer, Christian and Suedekum, Jens, Supplier Search and             
Re-matching in Global Sourcing – Theory and Evidence from China, November 2017. 
272 Thomas, Tobias, Heß, Moritz and Wagner, Gert G., Reluctant to Reform? A Note on 
Risk-Loving Politicians and Bureaucrats, October 2017.                                   
Published in: Review of Economics, 68 (2017), pp. 167-179.  
271 Caprice, Stéphane and Shekhar, Shiva, Negative Consumer Value and Loss Leading, 
October 2017. 
270 Emch, Eric, Jeitschko, Thomas D. and Zhou, Arthur, What Past U.S. Agency Actions 
Say About Complexity in Merger Remedies, With an Application to Generic Drug 
Divestitures, October 2017.                                                                                     
Published in: Competition: The Journal of the Antitrust, UCL and Privacy Section of the 
California Lawyers Association, 27 (2017/18), pp. 87-104. 
269 Goeddeke, Anna, Haucap, Justus, Herr, Annika and Wey, Christian, Flexibility in 
Wage Setting Under the Threat of Relocation, September 2017.                             
Published in: Labour: Review of Labour Economics and Industrial Relations, 32 (2018),                  
pp. 1-22. 
268 Haucap, Justus, Merger Effects on Innovation: A Rationale for Stricter Merger 
Control?, September 2017.                                                                                    
Published in: Concurrences: Competition Law Review, 4 (2017), pp.16-21. 
267 Brunner, Daniel, Heiss, Florian, Romahn, André and Weiser, Constantin, Reliable 
Estimation of Random Coefficient Logit Demand Models, September 2017. 
266 Kosse, Fabian, Deckers, Thomas, Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah and Falk, Armin,                
The Formation of Prosociality: Causal Evidence on the Role of Social Environment,             
July 2017. 
265 Friehe, Tim and Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah, Predicting Norm Enforcement: The 
Individual and Joint Predictive Power of Economic Preferences, Personality, and  
Self-Control, July 2017.                                                                                       
Published in: European Journal of Law and Economics, 45 (2018), pp. 127-146. 
264 Friehe, Tim and Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah, Self-Control and Crime Revisited: 
Disentangling the Effect of Self-Control on Risk Taking and Antisocial Behavior,        
July 2017.                                                                                                                         
Published in: European Journal of Law and Economics, 45 (2018), pp. 127-146. 
263 Golsteyn, Bart and Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah, Challenges in Research on 
Preferences and Personality Traits: Measurement, Stability, and Inference,                  
July 2017.                                                                                                           
Published in: Journal of Economic Psychology, 60 (2017), pp. 1-6. 
262 Lange, Mirjam R.J., Tariff Diversity and Competition Policy – Drivers for Broadband 
Adoption in the European Union, July 2017.                                                             
Published in: Journal of Regulatory Economics, 52 (2017), pp. 285-312. 
261 Reisinger, Markus and Thomes, Tim Paul, Manufacturer Collusion: Strategic 
Implications of the Channel Structure, July 2017. 
260 Shekhar, Shiva and Wey, Christian, Uncertain Merger Synergies, Passive Partial 
Ownership, and Merger Control, July 2017. 
259 Link, Thomas and Neyer, Ulrike, Friction-Induced Interbank Rate Volatility under 
Alternative Interest Corridor Systems, July 2017. 
258 Diermeier, Matthias, Goecke, Henry, Niehues, Judith and Thomas, Tobias, Impact of 
Inequality-Related Media Coverage on the Concerns of the Citizens, July 2017. 
257 Stiebale, Joel and Wößner, Nicole, M&As, Investment and Financing Constraints,             
July 2017.      
256 Wellmann, Nicolas, OTT-Messaging and Mobile Telecommunication: A Joint           
Market? – An Empirical Approach, July 2017. 
255 Ciani, Andrea and Imbruno, Michele, Microeconomic Mechanisms Behind Export 
Spillovers from FDI: Evidence from Bulgaria, June 2017.                                            
Published in: Review of World Economics, 153 (2017), pp. 704-734. 
254 Hunold, Matthias and Muthers, Johannes, Capacity Constraints, Price Discrimination, 
Inefficient Competition and Subcontracting, June 2017. 
253 Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus and Köster, Mats, Salient Compromises in the Newsvendor 
Game, June 2017.                                                                                                              
Published in: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 141 (2017), pp. 301-315. 
252 Siekmann, Manuel, Characteristics, Causes, and Price Effects: Empirical Evidence of 
Intraday Edgeworth Cycles, May, 2017. 
251 Benndorf, Volker, Moellers, Claudia and Normann, Hans-Theo, Experienced vs. 
Inexperienced Participants in the Lab: Do they Behave Differently?, May 2017. 
Published in: Journal of the Economic Science Association, 3 (2017), pp.12-25. 
250 Hunold, Matthias, Backward Ownership, Uniform Pricing and Entry Deterrence,          
May 2017. 
249 Kreickemeier, Udo and Wrona, Jens, Industrialisation and the Big Push in a Global 
Economy, May 2017. 
248 Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus and Köster, Mats, Local Thinking and Skewness 
Preferences, April 2017. 
247 Shekhar, Shiva, Homing Choice and Platform Pricing Strategy, March 2017. 
246 Manasakis, Constantine, Mitrokostas, Evangelos and Petrakis, Emmanuel, Strategic 
Corporate Social Responsibility by a Multinational Firm, March 2017. 
245 Ciani, Andrea, Income Inequality and the Quality of Imports, March 2017. 
244 Bonnet, Céline and Schain, Jan Philip, An Empirical Analysis of Mergers: Efficiency 
Gains and Impact on Consumer Prices, February 2017. 
243 Benndorf, Volker and Martinez-Martinez, Ismael, Perturbed Best Response Dynamics 
in a Hawk-Dove Game, January 2017.                                                                       
Published in: Economics Letters, 153 (2017), pp. 61-64. 
242 Dauth, Wolfgang, Findeisen, Sebastian and Suedekum, Jens, Trade and 
Manufacturing Jobs in Germany, January 2017.                                                    
Published in: American Economic Review, Papers & Proceedings, 107 (2017), pp. 337-342. 
241 Borrs, Linda and Knauth, Florian, The Impact of Trade and Technology on Wage 
Components, December 2016. 
240 Haucap, Justus, Heimeshoff, Ulrich and Siekmann, Manuel, Selling Gasoline as a   
By-Product: The Impact of Market Structure on Local Prices, December 2016. 
239 Herr, Annika and Normann, Hans-Theo, How Much Priority Bonus Should be Given to 
Registered Organ Donors? An Experimental Analysis, November 2016. 
238 Steffen, Nico, Optimal Tariffs and Firm Technology Choice: An Environmental 
Approach, November 2016. 
237 Behrens, Kristian, Mion, Giordano, Murata, Yasusada and Suedekum, Jens, Distorted 
Monopolistic Competition, November 2016. 
236 Beckmann, Klaus, Dewenter, Ralf and Thomas, Tobias, Can News Draw Blood? The 
Impact of Media Coverage on the Number and Severity of Terror Attacks,          
November 2016.                                                                                                     
Published in: Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, 23 (1) 2017, pp. 1-16. 
235 Dewenter, Ralf, Dulleck, Uwe and Thomas, Tobias, Does the 4th Estate Deliver? 
Towars a More Direct Measure of Political Media Bias, November 2016. 
234 Egger, Hartmut, Kreickemeier, Udo, Moser, Christoph and Wrona, Jens, Offshoring 
and Job Polarisation Between Firms, November 2016. 
233 Moellers, Claudia, Stühmeier, Torben and Wenzel, Tobias, Search Costs in 
Concentrated Markets – An Experimental Analysis, October 2016. 
232 Moellers, Claudia, Reputation and Foreclosure with Vertical Integration – 
Experimental Evidence, October 2016. 
231 Alipranti, Maria, Mitrokostas, Evangelos and Petrakis, Emmanuel, Non-comparative 
and Comparative Advertising in Oligopolistic Markets, October 2016.                 
Forthcoming in: The Manchester School. 
230 Jeitschko, Thomas D., Liu, Ting and Wang, Tao, Information Acquisition, Signaling 
and Learning in Duopoly, October 2016. 
229 Stiebale, Joel and Vencappa, Dev, Acquisitions, Markups, Efficiency, and Product 
Quality: Evidence from India, October 2016.                                                  
Forthcoming in: Journal of International Economics. 
228 Dewenter, Ralf and Heimeshoff, Ulrich, Predicting Advertising Volumes: A Structural 
Time Series Approach, October 2016.                                                                   
Published in: Economics Bulletin, 37 (2017), Volume 3. 
227 Wagner, Valentin, Seeking Risk or Answering Smart? Framing in Elementary 
Schools, October 2016. 
226 Moellers, Claudia, Normann, Hans-Theo and Snyder, Christopher M., Communication 
in Vertical Markets: Experimental Evidence, July 2016.                                     
Published in: International Journal of Industrial Organization, 50 (2017), pp. 214-258. 
225 Argentesi, Elena, Buccirossi, Paolo, Cervone, Roberto, Duso, Tomaso and Marrazzo, 
Alessia, The Effect of Retail Mergers on Prices and Variety: An Ex-post Evaluation, 
June 2016. 
224 Aghadadashli, Hamid, Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus and Wey, Christian, The Nash 
Bargaining Solution in Vertical Relations With Linear Input Prices, June 2016. 
Published in: Economics Letters, 145 (2016), pp. 291-294. 
223 Fan, Ying, Kühn, Kai-Uwe and Lafontaine, Francine, Financial Constraints and Moral 
Hazard: The Case of Franchising, June 2016.                     
Published in: Journal of Political Economy, 125 (2017), pp. 2082-2125. 
222 Benndorf, Volker, Martinez-Martinez, Ismael and Normann, Hans-Theo, Equilibrium 
Selection with Coupled Populations in Hawk-Dove Games: Theory and Experiment in 
Continuous Time, June 2016.                                                                                 
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory, 165 (2016), pp. 472-486. 
221 Lange, Mirjam R. J. and Saric, Amela, Substitution between Fixed, Mobile, and Voice 
over IP Telephony – Evidence from the European Union, May 2016. 
Published in: Telecommunications Policy, 40 (2016), pp. 1007-1019. 
220  Dewenter, Ralf, Heimeshoff, Ulrich and Lüth, Hendrik, The Impact of the Market 
Transparency Unit for Fuels on Gasoline Prices in Germany, May 2016. 
Published in: Applied Economics Letters, 24 (2017), pp. 302-305. 
219 Schain, Jan Philip and Stiebale, Joel, Innovation, Institutional Ownership, and 
Financial Constraints, April 2016. 
218 Haucap, Justus and Stiebale, Joel, How Mergers Affect Innovation: Theory and 
Evidence from the Pharmaceutical Industry, April 2016. 
217 Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus and Wey, Christian, Evidence Production in Merger Control: 
The Role of Remedies, March 2016. 
216 Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus, Köhler, Katrin, Lange, Mirjam R. J. and Wenzel, Tobias, 
Demand Shifts Due to Salience Effects: Experimental Evidence, March 2016. 
Published in: Journal of the European Economic Association, 15 (2017), pp. 626-653. 
215 Dewenter, Ralf, Heimeshoff, Ulrich and Thomas, Tobias, Media Coverage and Car 
Manufacturers’ Sales, March 2016. 
Published in: Economics Bulletin, 36 (2016), pp. 976-982. 
214 Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus and Riener, Gerhard, A First Test of Focusing Theory, 
February 2016. 
213 Heinz, Matthias, Normann, Hans-Theo and Rau, Holger A., How Competitiveness 
May Cause a Gender Wage Gap: Experimental Evidence, February 2016. 
Forthcoming in: European Economic Review, 90 (2016), pp. 336-349. 
212 Fudickar, Roman, Hottenrott, Hanna and Lawson, Cornelia, What’s the Price of 
Consulting? Effects of Public and Private Sector Consulting on Academic Research, 
February 2016.                                                                                                                           
Forthcoming in: Industrial and Corporate Change. 
211 Stühmeier, Torben, Competition and Corporate Control in Partial Ownership 
Acquisitions, February 2016.  
Published in: Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 16 (2016), pp. 297-308. 
210 Muck, Johannes, Tariff-Mediated Network Effects with Incompletely Informed 
Consumers, January 2016. 
209 Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus and Wey, Christian, Structural Remedies as a Signalling 
Device, January 2016. 
Published in: Information Economics and Policy, 35 (2016), pp. 1-6.  
208 Herr, Annika and Hottenrott, Hanna, Higher Prices, Higher Quality? Evidence From 
German Nursing Homes, January 2016. 
 Published in: Health Policy, 120 (2016), pp. 179-189. 
207 Gaudin, Germain and Mantzari, Despoina, Margin Squeeze: An Above-Cost 
Predatory Pricing Approach, January 2016. 
Published in: Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 12 (2016), pp. 151-179. 
206 Hottenrott, Hanna, Rexhäuser, Sascha and Veugelers, Reinhilde, Organisational 
Change and the Productivity Effects of Green Technology Adoption, January 2016. 
Published in: Energy and Ressource Economics, 43 (2016), pp. 172–194. 
205 Dauth, Wolfgang, Findeisen, Sebastian and Suedekum, Jens, Adjusting to Globa-
lization – Evidence from Worker-Establishment Matches in Germany, January 2016. 
 
Older discussion papers can be found online at: 
http://ideas.repec.org/s/zbw/dicedp.html 
 
 
ISSN 2190-9938 (online) 
ISBN 978-3-86304-288-2 
